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Abstract: This study examines the strategic choices of two rival manufacturers between competition and 
coopetition. A complex relationship exists between these two firms, who manufacture substitutive products. 
In addition, each of these firms has an option to purchase (or sell) a key component from (or to) the other. We 
develop a benchmark competition model and two coopetition models in which the manufacturers compete 
for end-customer demand while simultaneously collaborating on component production through wholesaling 
(wholesaling coopetition) or licensing (license coopetition). By comparing the equilibria of the competition 
model and two coopetition models, we find that the optimal strategy for coopetition is determined by not 
only the degree of product substitution but also the inter-firm power relationship in the negotiation of a 
cooperation contract (i.e., wholesale price and license fees) and the difference in production efficiency 
between the two manufacturers. Our research comprehensively examines how the external, 
relationship-specific, and internal factors affect firms’ optimal strategy selection and suggests a broad set of 
decision outcomes. Our study provides important managerial implications that can be utilized as strategic 
guidance for firms to pursue coopetition in various business environments. 





In numerous industries, firms purchase components or raw materials from upstream suppliers while 
competing with these same suppliers in the downstream market. For example, in the smartphone market, 
Google supplies the Android system to other smartphone vendors such as Samsung and Huawei. In addition, 
Google launched Pixel to compete in the smartphone market (Gibbs 2016). Furthermore, despite being sworn 
rivals in the hybrid and electric vehicle (HEV) market, Ford has offered to license its electric vehicle 
technology to other automakers (Atiyeh 2015). In the pharmaceutical sector, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, an 
Indian multinational pharmaceutical company, licensed and supplied its products to GlaxoSmithKline in 
various emerging markets to expand their market (Pitelis et al. 2015). This shift in the competitive paradigm 
has not exclusively occurred in the smartphone, automobile, and pharmaceutical industries. These types of 
relationships have become common in high-tech industries such as PC, TV, and medical devices, which are 
characterized by short product life cycles, rapid technical advancement, high research and development 
(R&D) expenses, and fierce competition. These pressures often drive numerous firms to collaborate with 
their fiercest competitors on upstream activities such as R&D and production resources (Cassiman et al. 
2009; Gnyawali and Park 2011; Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda 2016). 
With the rapid technological advancement and the development of emerging economies, firms have 
realized the importance of cooperation because of increasing pressure to integrate the global value chain that 
stems from a need for improved efficiency and productivity. In certain cases, legislative bodies have “forced” 
competitors to collaborate to achieve an efficient use of resources when doing so leads to improved 
economic welfare (Mariani, 2007). Thus, the notion of competition has evolved to coopetition, which is a 
concept that refers to interdependence in which competition and cooperation simultaneously occur between 
two or more firms; however, each firm focuses on increasing the size of the total pie for division 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda 2016). 
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A natural question that arises in these settings is whether the cooperation between rival firms is 
desirable from the perspectives of firms and consumers. Intuitively, the supplier benefits from a new revenue 
stream and the buyer will take advantage of reduced component costs and concentrate on its core operations. 
However, decisions concerning such a strategic engagement are more involved when it is embedded within a 
competitive relationship between market rivals. Supply chain cooperation enhances each firm’s 
competitiveness through increased efficiency or an additional revenue stream; however, this strategy could 
have a negative implication when each firm competes for customer demand. In this case, cooperation might 
have adverse effects on the firms. To help firms make the optimal strategic decision, it is essential to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the fundamental economics that govern coopetitive relationships between 
competing firms. Should firms purchase from or supply key components to their primary market rivals? 
What is the optimal unit component price when supplying to or purchasing from a firm’s rival? Should firms 
license their key technologies to fierce market rivals? How do these coopetitive relationships affect the firms 
and consumers? 
To investigate these issues, we consider a complex relationship between two manufacturing firms who 
produce partially substitutable products and compete for end-customer demand. The substitutable products 
(e.g., smartphones or tablet computers) require a key component (e.g., chips or displays) that can be 
manufactured by either of the two firms with different manufacturing costs. The manufacturers can produce 
the component in house, or they can purchase it from a market rival at a lower cost. Alternatively, a 
manufacturer can pay a fixed license fee plus a royalty based on a rate to its market rival to adopt the rival’s 
technology for manufacturing the component at a lower cost. The scenario in which both manufacturers 
make the component in-house is referred to as the competition model, and the cases in which one 
manufacturer opts to procure the component from or pay licensing fees to the rival manufacturer are referred 
to as the coopetition models. We seek to understand the dynamic relationship between the embedded 
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competition and cooperation elements and how the strategic movement of coopetition affects individual 
firms’ operational decision and financial performance by analyzing the equilibriums of the competition and 
coopetition models and examining manufacturers’ pricing strategies and consequences of total sales and 
profitability.  
This study makes several contributions. First, our research contributes to the coopetition literature by 
investigating production coopetition between two rival firms and filling a significant gap in the literature. 
This problem differs from conventional supply chain cooperation and/or outsourcing problems in which the 
cooperation and competition elements primarily concentrate on a vertical supplier-buyer relationship in the 
supply chain. In contrast, our study explores how interaction of horizontal market competition and vertical 
supply chain cooperation affects firms’ performance individually and collectively. This exploration enables 
us to derive the structured optimal solutions for the firms and enhances our understanding of the nature of 
coopetitive behavior by analyzing the dynamic relationship between the competing and cooperating forces. 
This study contributes to the continuing debates concerning the efficacy of coopetition (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001) and the role of an agentic or structural perspective in 
understanding the dynamics of simultaneous competition and cooperation for an inter-firm relationship (Das 
and Teng 2000; Peng and Bourne 2009; Dorn et al. 2016). Second, our analysis provides notable results that 
are new. For example, the optimal strategy for coopetition is determined by not only the intensity of market 
competition (Tsay and Agrawal 2000; Peng and Bourne 2009; Ritala 2012) but also the joint effect of 
external market characteristics, the power relationship between manufacturers in the negotiation of the 
cooperation contract (i.e., wholesale price and license fees) and the difference in production efficiency 
between them. By examining the coopetition effect on firms’ retail prices and individual and collective 
profits, we identify the decision region for stable and unstable coopetition.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: after reviewing relevant studies in Section 2, the 
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Cournot competition, wholesaling coopetition (WC), and license coopetition (LC) models are presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 examines the effect of coopetition on the retail prices and maximum profits of two 
manufacturing firms by comparing the equilibrium results of the three different models. Section 5 discusses 
the selection of a coopetition strategy. Section 6 extends the analysis to the asymmetric-manufacturer case 
and the case of both partial and perfect substitutes, and examines their effect on the selection decision. 
Section 7 discusses the managerial relevance and insights of our research findings. Finally, we draw 
conclusions and provide suggestions for future studies in Section 8. 
2. Literature review 
Our study is related to several streams of research: competition, cooperation and coopetition. Numerous prior 
studies have been conducted concerning competition and cooperation. However, few studies have been 
conducted regarding coopetition, which is defined as a dyadic relationship involving firms' simultaneous 
engagement in competition and cooperation (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Bengtsson and Kock 2000). 
Why do firms cooperate with their rivals? Using game theory, Brandenbruger and Nalebuff (1996) 
explain that coopetition embraces the logic that firms cooperate to increase their size of the business pie and 
then compete with each other to divide it. From resource dependence theory and the resource-based view, 
firms can seek to improve the efficiency of their use of existing resources when serving their current market 
share or capturing a larger share (Ritala 2012; Dorn et al. 2016). Typical examples of this motive include the 
airline industry, in which alliances are often developed between rival airlines to gain efficiency benefits by 
sharing resources (Oum et al. 2004; Garrette et al. 2009). Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) classify the 
drivers of coopetition into three categories: external, relationship-specific, and internal. External drivers 
include environmental conditions and industrial characteristics that force firms to engage in coopetition 
(Ritala 2012; Bengtsson and Johansson 2014). Relationship-specific drivers include partner and relationship 
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characteristics that facilitate coopetition (Peng and Bourne 2009; Gnyawali and Park 2011). Internal drivers 
include specific motives, resources and capabilities that motivate firms to be proactive or reactive in 
pursuing coopetitive strategies (Gnyawali and Park 2009; Ritala et al. 2014).  
    Since the seminal study conducted by D’Jacquemin and Aspremont (1988) concerning cooperative and 
non-cooperative R&D, studies concerning coopetition have explored various management fields including 
innovation (e.g., Gnyawali and Park 2011; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2013), strategic alliances (e.g., 
Dussauge et al. 2000; Rai 2016), international business (e.g., Kim and Parkhe 2009), marketing (e.g., Luo et 
al. 2006; Bello et al. 2010) and supply chain management (e.g., Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009; Wilhelm 2011). 
In addition, prior studies incorporated various levels of analysis including cross-functional units at the 
intra-firm level (e.g., Tsai 2002; Luo et al. 2006) or rival firms at the inter-firm level (e.g., Garrette et al. 
2009; Luo et al. 2016). This concept has been extended to networks at the intra-network (e.g., Gnyawali et al. 
2006; Schiavone and Simoni 2011) and inter-network levels (e.g., Peng and Bourne 2009; Schiavone and 
Simoni 2011). Interestingly, few studies have analyzed coopetition at the production stage of the value chain. 
Most of these studies adopt conceptual or empirical approaches such as case studies or surveys. Despite 
the call for game theory approaches by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) in their study concerning 
coopetition, very few studies (Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009; Carfì and Schiliro et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2016) 
have applied game theory to coopetitive decision problems. Bakshi and Kleindorfer (2009) analyze the 
choice of risk mitigation strategies by supply chain participants using the Harsanyi-Selten-Nash bargaining 
framework and determine that coopetition is superior to competition in the context of managing supply chain 
security. At the macroeconomic level, Carfì and Schiliro (2012) apply the complex construct of coopetition 
to address climate change challenges and demonstrate that a coopetitive strategy can deliver win-win 
solutions for participating countries that seek to implement green economies. At the microeconomic level, 
Luo et al. (2016) employ a game theory model to examine the role of coopetition in low-carbon 
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manufacturing and determine that coopetition is a viable strategy that can increase profits and reduce the 
firms’ total carbon emissions. Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda (2016) develop a game theory model in which 
firms cooperate to enhance the quality of innovation ecosystems. They examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of coopetition strategies for participating firms and society. In contrast to these studies, we 
examine coopetition for production, which is an upstream supply chain activity, in the context of two 
manufacturers who produce substitutive products and can simultaneously engage in supplier-buyer 
cooperation and a licensing arrangement for one key component of their finished products. 
More relevant to the setting of this work, Venkatesh et al. (2006) examine the optimal choice among 
three distribution strategies: sole entrant, co-optor, or component supplier for proprietary component 
manufacturers (PCMs). The authors show that although each strategy has its unique domain of optimality, 
the co-optor strategy, in which a PCM opts to sell to customers directly and to sell supplies to its competitor, 
is the most widely optimal for PCMs. Xu et al. (2010) extend the work of Venkatesh et al. (2006) by 
examining the effect of horizontal differentiation and capability advantage on the optimal choice of 
distribution strategy. The above two studies only adopt a PCM’s perspective on whether to supply a 
proprietary component to be assembled in the competitor’s end product. From the perspective of original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), Pun (2015) examines outsourcing decisions of two competing OEMs in 
which firms can outsource either to each other or to third-party suppliers and finds that more cooperation 
between competitors can be harmful. Using a similar setting, Pun and Ghamat (2016) examine how 
competition affects component commonality and R&D joint-venture decisions when outsourcing to 
competitors. Different from the above research, we use the concept of coopetition to examine how 
cooperation decisions between competitors affect firms and consumers. In addition, in contrast to the works 
of Venkatesh et al. (2006) and Xu et al. (2010), who model competition between PCM and OEM based on 
location, and the works of Pun (2015) and Pun and Ghamat (2016), who model competition based on price, 
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we model the end market competition as quantity based. 
The studies closest to ours are those of Wang et al. (2013) and Yang et al. (2017). Wang et al. (2013) 
adopt the Cournot competition model and use a similar setting. Different from their focus on a production 
outsourcing relationship between an OEM and a contract manufacturer, our research concentrates on the 
evaluation of the buyer-supplier coopetition strategy along with purely competition and licensing agreement 
strategies. Yang et al. (2017) also employ the concept of coopetition and the Cournot competition model to 
analyze the optimal distribution strategies for a supplier with limited supply capacity when selling to a 
competing buyer. Different from Yang et al. (2017) that consider an established supplier-buyer relationship 
and examine how the competition brought by supplier’s direct-selling channel affects their relationship and 
performances, we consider the case of an established market rivalry between two manufacturers and examine 
how cooperation in the form of wholesaling or licensing agreement affects market competition and 
consequential firm decisions and performance. In addition, different from both Wang et al. (2013) and Yang 
et al. (2017), who assume end-market demand to be symmetric, we consider both symmetric and asymmetric 
cases in our analysis. 
3. The models and equilibrium analysis 
3.1. The model 
We consider two competitive manufacturers who produce partially substitutable products and compete in the 
market. When making the products, the manufacturers incur two types of costs: a component cost and a 
product production cost. Prior to presenting the models, we introduce our notations in Table 1 as follows. 
Table 1. Notations 
𝑐1, 𝑐2 Unit component cost for manufacturers 1 and 2 




𝑚 Manufacturer’s unit production cost 
𝑞1, 𝑞2 Demand for manufacturers 1 and 2 
𝑟 Manufacturer 1’s royalty fee for the component, where 0 < 𝑟 < ∆𝑐 
𝑀 Manufacturer 1’s fixed license fee for the component, 𝑀 > 0 
𝑝1, 𝑝2 Unit retail price for manufacturers 1 and 2 
𝑤 Manufacturer 1’s unit component wholesale price, where 𝑐1 < 𝑤 < 𝑐2 
𝛿1, 𝛿2 Maximum unit profit for manufacturers 1 and 2; 𝛿1 = 𝛼 − 𝑚 − 𝑐1 > 0, 𝛿2 = 𝛼 − 𝑚 −
𝑐2 > 0 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1),  𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) Profit for manufacturers 1 and 2 using the competition model 
𝜋1
𝑐(𝑞1, 𝑤), 𝜋2
𝑐(𝑞2) Profit for manufacturers 1 and 2 using the wholesaling coopetition model 
𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1), 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) Profit for manufacturers 1 and 2 using the license coopetition model  
𝜋𝑛 Manufacturers’ total profit using the competition model; 𝜋𝑛 = 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) + 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) 




𝜋𝑙 Manufacturers’ total profit using the license coopetition model; 𝜋𝑙 = 𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1) + 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) 
𝜃 Manufacturer 1’s negotiation/bargaining power, 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 
In alignment with prior studies (e.g., Wang et al. 2013; Shang et al. 2016; Yang et al. 2017), we use the 
following demand function: 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗), 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
This type of linear inverse demand function is commonly used in the economics, marketing, and 
operations fields to investigate product competition (Farahat and Perakis 2011; Wang et al. 2013; Yang et al. 
2017). Each manufacturer’s retail price decreases its production quantity and the competitor’s production 
quantity. For this study, 𝛼 represents the manufacturer’s maximum retail price. 𝛽 (𝛽 ≥ 0) is a parameter 
that is interpreted as the degree of product substitution of manufacturer 𝑗’s product over that of manufacturer 
𝑖. It measures the cross-effect of the change in manufacturer i’s product demand caused by a change in that 
of manufacturer 𝑗. A low value of 𝛽 indicates a low degree of product substitution. If 𝛽 = 0, it corresponds 
to the case of independent products and products are not substitutable. In contrast, a high value of 𝛽 
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corresponds to the case of high degree of substitution. A high degree of product substitution often leads to 
more intense market competition (Wang et al. 2013; Qing et al. 2017). 
 
Figure 1: Framework 
We consider three models for the relationship between the two manufacturers (as illustrated in Figure 1): 
Cournot competition, wholesaling coopetition (WC), and license coopetition (LC). For the Cournot 
competition model, manufacturers produce their own component, and the two firms have a competitive 
relationship in which they compete in quantities by simultaneously choosing production quantities. Both 
firms are economically rational and act strategically to maximize profits based on their competitors' 
decisions. For the WC model, manufacturer 2 purchases components from manufacturer 1; the two 
manufacturers compete in the downstream retail market but have a supplier-buyer cooperative relationship in 
the upstream component production. For the LC model, manufacturer 2 obtains a license from manufacturer 
1 by paying a fixed licensing fee and royalty rate; the two manufacturers compete in the downstream retail 
market and have a cooperative relationship in the form of a license agreement for producing upstream 
components. 
3.2. Competition model 


















First, we explore the Cournot competition model as a benchmark so that we can compare the equilibria of the 
WC and LC models with the equilibria of the benchmark model to examine the effect of coopetition on 
manufacturers’ performance. In the competition model, the two manufacturers independently and 
simultaneously determine their production quantities to maximize their profits, and manufacturer 1’s profit 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝑞1 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐1]𝑞1.                     (1) 
The first part of this formula represents manufacturer 1’s marginal unit profit, and the second part 
represents manufacturer 1’s market demand. 
Similarly, for the competition model, manufacturer 2’s profit 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝑞2 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐2]𝑞2.                     (2) 
Table 2 lists the optimal production quantities (𝑞1
𝑛, 𝑞2
𝑛) for the two manufacturers based on equations (1) 
and (2). The derivation of these optimal solutions is provided in the Appendix.  
Table 2. Optimal solutions for the three models 
Models Competition model 
(𝑖 = 𝑛) 
WC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑐) 
LC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑙) 
𝑞1
𝑖  (2 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 𝛽∆𝑐
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
𝛿1(8 + 3𝛽
2 + 𝛽(14 + 𝜃) − 𝛽𝑇𝑎)
2(1 + 𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
 
(4 + 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑝1
𝑖  𝑚 + 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1
𝑛 𝑚 + 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1
𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1
𝑙  
𝑞2
𝑖  (2 + 𝛽)𝛿2 − 𝛽∆𝑐
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
𝛿1(2 − 𝜃 + 𝑇𝑎)
8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2
 
2𝛿1
4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2
 
𝑝2
𝑖  𝑚 + 𝑐2 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞2
𝑛 
 𝑚 + 𝑤𝑐 +
(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1(2 − 𝜃 + 𝑇𝑎)
2(1 + 𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
 𝑚 + 𝑐1 +
𝛿1(4 + 12𝛽 + 8𝛽
2 + 𝛽3)
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑤 𝑖 / 
𝑐1 +
𝛿1(3𝛽
3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 + 𝜃) − 2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝑇𝑎)
2(1 + 𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
 
/ 
𝑟𝑖 / / 𝛽(2 + 𝛽)
2𝛿1
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑀𝑖 / / 𝛿1
2(16(1 + 𝛽)2 − (32 + 96𝛽 + 76𝛽2 + 16𝛽3 + 𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃))




where 𝑇𝑎 = √(12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽
2)(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃2. 
By examining Table 2, we can derive the effect of the market competition on the manufacturers’ 
optimal retail prices and maximum profits. Here, we mainly focus on the effect of the degree of product 
substitution, 𝛽, a parameter that is associated to market competition (Wang et al. 2013; Qing et al. 2017). 
Lemma 1: (1) 𝑝2
𝑛, 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1
𝑛) and  𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛)  decrease in 𝛽; (2) if 0 < ∆𝑐 ≤
𝛿1
5
 or ∆𝑐 >
𝛿1
5
 and 0 <
𝛽 < 𝛽𝑁, then 𝑝1
𝑛 decreases in 𝛽; if ∆𝑐 >
𝛿1
5
 and 𝛽 > 𝛽𝑁, then 𝑝1
𝑛 increases in 𝛽.1 
Lemma 1 indicates that for the competition model, higher degree of production substitution (𝛽) 
negatively affect manufacturers’ profitability, which is consistent with the classic economic theory that 
intense matket competition harms firms’ financial performance because such competition can lead to a price 
war between rival competitors. Surprisingly, whereas high degree of product substitution certainly drives 
down the retail price of manufacturer 2, the effect of 𝛽 on manufacturer 1’s optimal retail price is more 
complicated. This effect depends upon the relationship of 𝛽 with a critical threshold 𝛽𝑁, and the difference 
in the unit component cost between the two manufacturers (∆𝑐) and its relationship with manufacturer 1’s 
maximum unit profit (𝛿1), as shown in Lemma 1. This dependency exists because manufacturer 1 has the 
advantage of a lower unit-component cost. A larger cost advantage can offset the manufacturer’s pressure to 
engage in a price war with its rival competitor despite high degree of product substitution. For instance, 
Huawei, one of the leading smartphone manufacturers in the Chinese Smartphone market, has the advantage 
of production cost over their rivals for some key components because of their R&D and production 
capability. Interestingly, they adopt a more conventional pricing policy when engaging in low-end product 
competition. In contrast, they often do not engage in a price war with rivals for the high-end product range, 
which is often viewed as more-intense market competition,  
                                                             
1 The form of 𝛽𝑁 is listed in the proof of the lemma in the Appendix. Its value depends upon the maximum unit 




3.3. Wholesaling coopetition model 
For the WC model, a supplier-buyer cooperative relationship exists between the two rival manufacturers. 
Manufacturer 2 purchases components from manufacturer 1 while competing for the same market. It is 
common to have this type of relationship in the PC and electronics industries, in which manufacturers engage 
supplier-buyer cooperation and market competition simultaneously (Wang et al. 2013; Yang et al. 2017). 
Therefore, the two manufacturers’ decision sequence is described as follows. First, manufacturers negotiate 
the wholesale price (𝑤) for the component. Second, manufacturer 2 decides its order quantity (𝑞2) for the 
component from manufacturer 1. Third, manufacturer 1 decides the production quantity 𝑞1 + 𝑞2, where 𝑞1 
represents manufacturer 1’s demand. Finally, when the end-consumers’ demand is realized, the two 
manufacturers obtain their revenue/profits accordingly. 
For the WC model, manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑞1) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋1
𝑐(𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝑞1 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐1]𝑞1 + (𝑤 − 𝑐1)𝑞2.           (3) 
The first part of the formula represents the profit from product sales, and the second part represents the 
profit from wholesaling the component to manufacturer 2.1 
Similarly, for the WC model, manufacturer 2’s profit 𝜋2
𝑐(𝑞2) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋2
𝑐(𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝑞2 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑤]𝑞2                       (4) 
Following the literature (e.g., Nagarajan and Bassok 2008; Chen et al. 2016), we introduce parameter 𝜃 
to measure the negotiation power of manufacturer 1. Correspondingly, the negotiation power of manufacturer 
2 will be 1 −  𝜃. With extreme negotiation powers, the bargaining over the wholesaling model is equivalent 
to the standard Stackelberg or Vertical Nash games. The wholesale price negotiation process for the WC 









1−𝜃                 (5) 
Manufacturer 1’s optimal production quantity (𝑞1
𝑐), optimal retail price (𝑝1
𝑐) and optimal component 
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wholesale price (𝑤𝑐) and manufacturer 2’s optimal order quantity (𝑞2
𝑐) and optimal retail price (𝑝2
𝑐) in the 
WC model are provided in Table 2. With respect to the effect of 𝛽 on manufacturers’ optimal retail prices 
and maximum profits, we present the following lemma. 





𝑐) decrease in 𝛽; (2) if 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐴 and 𝜃𝑦 <
𝜃 < 1, then 𝑝1
𝑐 increases in 𝛽; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐴, or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐴 and 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑦, then 𝑝1
𝑐 decreases in 𝛽; 
(3) if 𝜃𝑡 < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑠, 1}, then 𝑤𝑐 decreases in 𝛽; if 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑡, or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐶 and 𝜃𝑠 < 𝜃 < 1, then 
𝑤𝑐 increases in 𝛽.2 
This lemma indicates that the two manufacturers’ profits and manufacturer 2’s retail price are 
decreasing functions of the degree of product substitution (𝛽) for the WC model. This finding is similar to 
the competition model, which means that the buyer-supplier cooperation between the two competing 
manufacturers does not affect how the market competition factor impacts their financial performance. 
Different from the classic economic theory, the effect of the degree of product substitution on manufacturer 
1’s optimal retail price and component wholesale price is more complex for the WC model. Depending upon 
the relationship between 𝛽  and 𝛽𝐴  and the relationships between 𝜃  and the corresponding critical 
thresholds (𝜃𝑐 and 𝜃𝑦), manufacturer 1’s optimal retail price can be an increasing or decreasing function of 
𝛽. Similarly, depending upon the relationship between 𝛽 and 𝛽𝐶 and the relationships between 𝜃 and the 
corresponding critical thresholds (𝜃𝑐, 𝜃𝑠, and 𝜃𝑡), manufacturer 1’s optimal wholesale price can be a 
decreasing or increasing function of 𝛽  because high degree of product substitution will drive both 
manufacturers’ retail prices down. At the same time, manufacturer 1 is able to set a higher wholesale price 
due to its possessing a greater negotiation power than that of manufacturer 2, and the revenue generated from 
component sales must be incorporated by manufacturer 1 in setting its optimal retail price. It implies that 
                                                             
2 The forms of 𝜃𝑦, 𝜃𝑠, 𝜃𝑡 and 𝜃𝑐 are listed in the proof of the lemma in the Appendix. Their values depend 
upon the degree of product substitution (𝛽). 
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manufacturers must consider the inter-firm power relationship and market competition factor when deciding 
the wholesale prices for key components and setting retail prices for their products when engaging wholesale 
coopetition.  
3.4. License coopetition model 
For the LC model, a cooperative relationship exists in the form of a licensing arrangement between the two 
rival manufacturers. This type of relationship is common in the pharmaceutical and technological industries, 
in which a firm licenses its innovation to a potential competitor (Simonet 2002; Ziedonis 2007). In the 
context of this study, manufacturer 1 licenses manufacturer 2 to use its technology to produce the component 
while competing for the same market. Therefore, the two manufacturers’ decision sequence is described as 
follows. First, the manufacturers negotiate the fixed license fee (𝑀) and the royalty rate (𝑟) for the 
component. Second, the two manufacturers independently and simultaneously determine their production 
quantities to maximize their profits. Finally, when the end-consumers’ demand is realized, the two 
manufacturers obtain their revenues and profits accordingly. 
For the LC model, manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝑞1 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐1]𝑞1 + 𝑟𝑞2 + 𝑀                 (6) 
The first part of the formula represents the profit from product sales, and the second part represents the 
license fees that are received from manufacturer 2. 
For the LC model, manufacturer 2’s profit  𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝑞2 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐1]𝑞2 − 𝑟𝑞2 − 𝑀                 (7) 
The first part of the formula represents the unit marginal profit of manufacturer 2, and the second and 
the third parts represent the royalty fee and fixed license fee paid to manufacturer 1. 
Assuming that manufacturer 1’s negotiation power is 𝜃, we can model the negotiation process of the 













                (8) 
The optimal production quantities (𝑞1
𝑙 , 𝑞2
𝑙 ) and optimal retail prices (𝑝1
𝑙 , 𝑝2
𝑙 ) for both manufacturers in 
the LC model are provided in Table 2. 
Similar to Lemma 2, we can derive Lemma 3 concerning the effect of 𝛽 on the manufacturers’ optimal 
retail prices and maximum profits. 




𝑙 ), and 𝑀𝑙 decrease in 𝛽; 𝑟𝑙 increases in 𝛽. (2) If 
0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑋 = 2, then 𝑝1
𝑙  and 𝑝2
𝑙  decrease in 𝛽; if 𝛽𝑋 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑌 ≈ 3.7587, then 𝑝1
𝑙  increases in 𝛽 
and 𝑝2
𝑙  decreases in 𝛽; if 𝛽 > 𝛽𝑌, then 𝑝1
𝑙  and 𝑝2
𝑙  increase in 𝛽. 
Similar to the WL model, the licensing cooperation does not change the effect of the degree of product 
substitution on the two manufacturers’ financial performance. Interestingly, Lemma 3 indicates that in the LC 
model, the optimal fixed license fee is a decreasing function of 𝛽, whereas the optimal royalty rate is an 
increasing function of 𝛽. A low fixed-license fee helps break the ice of intense competition and engages the 
rival firms in the license cooperation. The royalty rate often constitutes the main part of the licensing 
agreement cost, and firms tend to charge a higher royalty rate when agreeing on licensing with their fiercest 
market rivals. Revenue (or cost) from the licensing agreement has a knock-on effect on the optimal retail 
price of manufacturer 1 (or manufacturer 2). For manufacturer 1, the revenue from a licensing agreement 
mitigates the pressure of a decreasing retail price from the intense market competition. For manufacturer 2, 
the cost of the licensing agreement must be a factor of setting the optimal retail price. For example, the 
incremental licensing revenue has helped technology giant Nokia, which has licensing agreements with all 
major smartphone manufacturers to compensate for the declines from tough competition in the telecom 
market (Rogers 2018). The tradeoff between the cooperation and competition forces will determine how the 
two manufacturers’ optimal retail prices are influenced by the market competition factor. More specifically, 
the competition force overtakes the cooperation force in influencing two manufacturers’ pricing decisions 
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when 𝛽 is less than the threshold 𝛽𝑋. In contrast, the cooperation force overtakes the competition force in 
influencing the pricing decisions when 𝛽 is greater than the threshold 𝛽𝑌. When 𝛽 is between the two 
thresholds (𝛽𝑋 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑌), it affects the two manufacturers’ optimal retail prices differently, as illustrated in 
Lemma 3. 
4. Effects of coopetition  
4.1. Effects of wholesaling coopetition 
In this section, we examine the effect of the WC strategy on optimal retail prices and maximum profits for 
both manufacturers by comparing the derived equilibrium solutions for the Cournot competition model and 
the WC model.  
4.1.1. Effect of wholesaling coopetition on optimal retail prices 
First, we present the effect of WC on manufacturers’ optimal retail prices. 




𝑛; if ∆𝑐𝐵 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻, or 





Lemma 4 implies that the wholesaling coopetition can drive up or down the prices of both 
manufacturers depending upon the differences in the unit component cost between manufacturers (∆𝑐), 
manufacturer 1’s negotiation power (𝜃) and their corresponding critical thresholds. More specifically, with a 
large value of ∆𝑐, wholesaling coopetition leads to a decrease of the optimal retail prices and therefore 
benefits the customers. With a small value of ∆𝑐, the effect of wholesaling coopetition on optimal retail 
prices is determined by other external market characteristics (i.e., 𝛽) and internal operational capability (i.e., 
𝛿1).  
                                                             
3 The forms of 𝜃𝑒, 𝜃𝑐, ∆𝑐𝐻  and ∆𝑐𝐵 are listed in the proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix. The value of 𝜃𝑒 
depends upon the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1), the difference in the unit component cost between 
manufacturers (∆𝑐), and the degree of product substitution (𝛽). The value of 𝜃𝑐 depends upon 𝛽. The values of both 
∆𝑐𝐻 and ∆𝑐𝐵  depend upon 𝛿1 and 𝛽. 
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4.1.2. Effect of wholesaling coopetition on maximum profits 
Next, we explore the effect of WC on the manufacturers’ maximum profits. 
Proposition 1: (1) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑞 , 1}, then WC is the better 
strategy; otherwise, competition is the better strategy.  
(2) When WC is a better strategy than competition is, if ∆𝑐𝐴 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝜃𝑓 < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑔, 1}, 
























This proposition implies that whether the wholesaling coopetition increases or decreases the 
manufacturers’ maximum profits compared with the competition model is decided by the degree of product 
substitution (𝛽), manufacturers’ negotiation power relationship (𝜃), and internal operational capabilities 
(∆𝑐 and 𝛿1). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2, which is divided into three decision regions. The 
characteristics of each region are discussed next. 
                                                             
4 The values of ∆𝑐𝐻 , ∆𝑐𝐴 and ∆𝑐𝐾  depend upon the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1) and the 
degree of product substitution (𝛽). The value of 𝜃𝑐 depends upon 𝛽. The values of 𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑞 and 𝜃𝑔 depend upon 𝛿1, 




Figure 2: Effect of the WC strategy on manufacturers’ profits 
Region A outlines the decision region in which both manufacturers’ maximum profits for the WC 
model are greater than are those under the competition model, which implies that the wholesaling coopetition 
can lead to Pareto improvement. Consequently, such a coopetitive relationship will be embraced by both 
parties. From part (3) of Proposition 1, we know that in this Pareto improvement region, both manufacturers’ 
retail prices are lower than those under the competition model, which is beneficial for consumers. Therefore, 
we can conclude that in this situation, wholesaling coopetition positively affects individual firms and 
consumers.  
Region B specifies the conditions under which one of the two manufacturers will earn less profit in the 
WC model than in the competition model despite the total profit between the two being greater in the WC 
model than in the competition model (𝜋𝑐 > 𝜋𝑛). In this situation, the manufacturer, who suffers profit loss 
through wholesaling coopetition, has no incentive to continue the buyer-supplier cooperative relationship. In 
this case, the wholesaling coopetition can only continue the cooperation if the better-off manufacturer is 
willing to redistribute the profit gain between the two parties. A Pareto improvement can only be realized 















Region C specifies the conditions under which competition is the optimal strategy. More specifically, if 
manufacturer 1’s negotiation power is less than 𝜃𝑐, then 𝑤𝑟 < 𝑐1. It is not realistic for a firm to sell 
components to rival firms at a wholesale price that is lower than its production cost; therefore, the 
wholesaling coopetition is infeasible. In addition, if manufacturer 1’s negotiation power meets the condition 
of 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑝, then the total profit of the two firms will be less in the WC model than in the competition 
model (𝜋𝑐 < 𝜋𝑛). In this situation, competition is also the optimal strategy. 
4.2. Effects of license coopetition 
In this section, we examine the effect of the LC strategy on the optimal retail prices and maximum profits for 
both manufacturers by comparing the derived equilibrium solutions for the Cournot competition model and 
the LC model.  
4.2.1. Effect of license coopetition on optimal retail prices 
In the following, Lemma 5 presents the effect of LC on manufacturers’ optimal retail prices. 










Lemma 5 implies that, similar to wholesale coopetition, license coopetition can drive up or down the 
optimal retail prices of both manufacturers compared with the competition model. Again, this finding shows 
the difference between coopetition and collusion from consumers’ point of view. Different from wholesale 
coopetition, the effect of license coopetition on the manufacturers’ optimal retail prices is predominantly 
determined by ∆𝑐, 𝛿1 and 𝛽; manufacturer 1’s negotiation/bargaining power (𝜃) has no effect.  
4.2.2. Effect of license coopetition on maximum profits 
To determine the effect of license coopetition on manufacturers’ maximum profits, we derive the total profit 
                                                             
5 The mathematical forms of ∆𝑐𝐻 and ∆𝑐𝑌 are listed in the proof of Lemma 5 in the Appendix. Their values 
depend upon 𝛿1 and 𝛽. 
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of both manufacturers in the LC model and compare it with that in the competition model. Therefore, we 
propose the following: 
Proposition 2: (1) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 1, then LC is the better strategy; otherwise, 
competition is the better strategy. 
(2) When LC is the better strategy, if ∆𝑐𝑃 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑘} < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙, then LC delivers 
Pareto improvement; otherwise, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑙} < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1





𝑙 ) < 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛) ; if ∆𝑐𝐽 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑘 , then 𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1
𝑙 ) < 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1











This proposition implies that whether the license coopetition is beneficial to the manufacturers is 
determined by the degree of product substitution (𝛽), manufacturers’ negotiation power relationship (𝜃), and 
internal operational capabilities (∆𝑐 and 𝛿1). This relationship is further illustrated in Figure 3, which is 
divided into three decision regions. Similar to the WC model, each decision region is discussed individually. 
                                                             
6 The mathematical forms of ∆𝑐𝐻, ∆𝑐𝑃 , ∆𝑐𝐽, 𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑘 and 𝜃𝑙are listed in the proof of Proposition 1 in the 
Appendix. The values of ∆𝑐𝐻, ∆𝑐𝑃 and ∆𝑐𝐽 depend upon the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1) and the 





Figure 3. Effect of the LC strategy on manufacturers’ profits 
Region A highlights the decision region in which both manufacturers’ maximum profits for the LC 
model are greater than those under the competition model, which implies that license coopetition can achieve 
Pareto improvement. Consequently, such a coopetitive relationship will be embraced by both parties. From 
Proposition 2 (3), we also know that the license coopetition leads to lower retail prices compared with 
competition. Therefore, we can conclude that in this situation, license coopetition positively affects 
individual firms and consumers. Region B specifies the conditions under which one of the two 
manufacturers will incur profit loss in the LC model compared with the competition model, despite an 
increase in the total profit. In this case, the manufacturer incurring a profit loss has no incentive to engage in 
licensing cooperation. Nevertheless, because the total profit of two manufacturers in the LC model is greater 
than that in the competition model (𝜋𝑙 > 𝜋𝑛), the better-off manufacturer has the capacity to persuade its 
counterpart to continue cooperating if it is willing to redistribute the profit gained from coopetition. Pareto 
improvement can be realized through further cooperation. Region C describes the decision region in which 
competition is the optimal strategy. In this region, license coopetition will generate less profit than 







A: LC (Pareto) B: LC 
C: Competition 





words, manufacturer 1 will receive a negative fixed-licensing fee, which is not realistic. These results explain 
to some extent why firms in the automotive, smartphone and PC industries have license agreement with other 
vendors in the industry but not with their fiercest rivals (BBC 2014; Nokia 2016).  
5. Selection of a coopetition strategy 
In this section, we explore the optimal coopetition strategy considering different internal operational factors 
and external market circumstances. Proposition 3 summarizes the optimal strategy among competition, 
wholesaling coopetition and license coopetition. 
Proposition 3: (1) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 1, then LC is the optimal strategy. 
(2) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑗, then WC is the optimal strategy. 
(3) Otherwise, competition is the optimal strategy.7 
This proposition indicates that the optimal strategic decision on coopetition depends upon manufacturer 
1’s negotiation power (𝜃), the difference in the two manufacturers’ unit component cost (∆𝑐), and their 
relationships with the corresponding thresholds (𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐 and ∆𝑐𝐻). Note that these thresholds are 
determined by the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1) and the degree of product substitution (𝛽). 
This finding supports the view of Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) that external, relationship-specific, and 
internal drivers motivate firms to engage in coopetition. In the context of this research, the combination of 
the external market characteristic (𝛽), inter-firm power relationship (𝜃), and internal operational resources and 
capabilities (∆𝑐 and 𝛿1) governs firms’ strategic decisions on coopetition. The relationship between these 
external, relationship-specific, and internal factors and the manufacturers’ optimal strategy is further 
illustrated in Figure 4, which highlights three decision regions. Each region is discussed as follows:  
                                                             
7 The forms of ∆𝑐𝐻 , 𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑝 and 𝜃𝑐 are listed in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix. ∆𝑐𝐻  depends upon 
the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1) and the degree of product substitution (𝛽). 𝜃
𝑗 and 𝜃𝑐 depend upon 




Figure 4. Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜽, ∆𝒄) 
In Region I, license coopetition is the optimal strategy for both manufacturers; the license agreement 
results in a larger profit than do competition or wholesaling coopetition (𝜋𝑙 > {𝜋𝑐 , 𝜋𝑛}). In other words, 
firms are more likely to benefit from license coopetition when they license technology to rival firms with less 
negotiation power. In Region II, wholesaling coopetition is the optimal strategy for both manufacturers 
because it leads to a greater profit than does competition or license coopetition (𝜋𝑐 > {𝜋𝑙 , 𝜋𝑛}). However, in 
both Regions I & II, situations exist such that further cooperation such as a profit-sharing contract would be 
required to ensure that both firms benefit from the coopetitive relationship, as discussed in Propositions 1 & 
2. In Region III, competition is the optimal strategy for both manufacturers because the financial gains in the 
upstream key component production through either license coopetition or wholesaling coopetition cannot 
compensate for the losses that are incurred in the downstream market competition when facing a competitor 
strengthened due to coopetition. For numerous firms across various sectors, competition remains the most 
commonly adopted strategy when engaging with market rivals.  
5.1 Effect of product substitution on strategy selection  





















∆𝑐 significantly affects whether the strategy can achieve Pareto improvement without further cooperation in 
both licensing and wholesaling coopetition. It is more likely to achieve a win-win outcome from coopetition 
if there is a large difference between the two manufacturers’ unit component costs. More importantly, the 
optimal strategic choice is primarily determined by the negotiation power of manufacturer 1 ( 𝜃) . 
Furthermore, the degree of product substitution (𝛽) affects those critical thresholds 𝜃𝑗 and 𝜃𝑐 upon which 
the decision regions of optimal coopetition strategy depend. Therefore, further analysis is performed to 
analyze how the external market competition (β) and relationship-specific negotiation power (θ) affect the 
selection of the optimal coopetition strategy. Here, β depends upon the nature of the product/service and the 
characteristics of the industry, and θ is subject to the technical difficulty of component production and the 
availability of an alternative component supply in the market. We fix the value of ∆𝑐 (i.e., ∆𝑐 = 0.5) and 
plot the optimal strategic choice corresponding to different values of 𝛽 and 𝜃. We start the analysis with 
comparable values of 𝛽 and 𝜃 {𝛽, 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1)}, and the result is illustrated in Figure 5(a). If there is a low 
level of market competition, firms will benefit more by engaging in license coopetition when manufacturer 1 
has more negotiation power than does manufacturer 2; conversely, competition is the optimal strategy when 
manufacturer 1 has less negotiation power. If the market competition intensifies further, wholesale 
competition will be more beneficial when manufacturer 1 has more or similar power compared with 
manufacturer 2; otherwise, competition is the optimal strategy when manufacturer 1 has less power. From 
figure 5(a), it is also clear that only the two critical thresholds 𝜃𝑗 and 𝜃𝑐, whose values depend upon 𝛽 
and 𝜃, have influenced the decision on strategy selection. To further scrutinize the effect of the key 
parameters on coopetition strategy selection, we extend the value range of the degree of product substitution 
to 𝛽 ∈ (0, 10); the analysis result is illustrated in Figure 5(b). 
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Figure 5(a) 𝜷: 𝟎 → 𝟏                          Figure 5(b) 𝜷: 𝟎 → 𝟏𝟎 
Figure 5 Effect of 𝜷 on selection of coopetition strategies (∆𝒄 =  𝟎. 𝟓)  
Figure 5(b) shows clearly that the external market attributes (i.e., β and θ) profoundly influence the 
strategic choice of coopetition. Although the result in Figure 5(b) mirrors that in Figure 5(a) when the degree 
of product substitution is low, it also shows that when the degree of product substitution increases further to 
higher levels, it is more beneficial for manufacturers to choose competition only unless manufacturer 1 has 
negotiation power superior to that of manufacturer 2. The licensing or wholesale coopetition strategy has 
often been adopted in the smartphone and electronic vehicle, in which there is often high degree of product 
substitution among rival firms. Our analysis result also shows that coopetition particularly licensing 
agreement can be beneficial to firms when the degree of product substitution is low. This finding partially 
explains that there are more licensing agreements between firms with low degree of product substitution and 
more wholesale cooperation between firms with high degree of product substitution (BBC 2014; Kang, 2016; 
Nokia 2016). This result supports the views in the existing literature that, in highly competitive market 
environments where there are numerous rival firms offering substitutive products (Dussauge et al. 2000), or 
in a less competitive environment where there are only a limited number of competitors offering similar 
products (Peng and Bourne 2009), coopetition can be an effective strategy. However, the selection of optimal 

























and inter-firm power relationship but also influenced by the production capability difference, which will be 
further discussed in the following section.  
5.2 Effect of component cost difference on strategy selection  
The above results are based on the assumption of fixing the value of ∆c (i.e., ∆c = 0.5). However, as 
discussed previously, internal operational capability is one of the main drivers for firms to pursue a 
coopetition strategy. To examine the robustness of our results, further analysis is performed with a range of 
different values for ∆c (i.e., ∆c = 0.1, ∆c = 0.25, ∆c = 0.4, and ∆c = 0.58); the results are displayed in figure 6. 
It is clear that ∆c only affects the strategic choice between competition and wholesaling coopetition; it does 
not affect the decision on license coopetition. Whether to pursue license coopetition is decided by the 
relationship between 𝜃 and the threshold 𝜃𝑗, which is dependent upon 𝛽. For instance, automakers, PC 
manufacturers, and pharmaceutical firms license technologies and patents to many other firms, but often not 
to their fiercest market rival, because of the market competition factor and their inter-firm relationship as 
discussed previously. The effect of ∆𝑐 on strategy selection is primarily expressed through its influence on 
another critical threshold, 𝜃𝑝. Interestingly, we find that when the value of ∆c is small (i.e., ∆c = 0.1), a 
further increase of ∆c will move the intersection between the thresholds 𝜃𝑐 and 𝜃𝑝 rightwards, which 
means that wholesaling coopetition is more likely to be the preferred optimal strategy over competition. 
When the value of ∆c increases to a certain extent (i.e., ∆c = 0.25), 𝜃𝑐 > 𝜃𝑝; therefore, there is no 
intersection between the two thresholds. When the value of ∆c increases further (i.e., ∆c = 0.4 and ∆c = 0.5), 
the intersection between the two thresholds reappears and moves leftwards, which means competition is 
more likely to be the preferred optimal strategy over wholesale coopetition. These results reinforce the 
                                                             
8 The critical threshold ∆𝑐𝐻, which defines the feasible region of maximum ∆c value, is determined by 𝛿1 and 𝛽. 
Because 𝛽 ∈ (0, 10) is specified in the analysis of Section 5.1, we derive the maximum feasible value of ∆c as 0.54 
through inputting 𝛽 = 10 in the mathematical expression of ∆𝑐𝐻 . Therefore, the values of ∆c considered in the 
analysis cover a reasonable range.  
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findings of Proposition 3 that the relationship between 𝜃 and 𝜃𝑝 determines the strategic choice between 
wholesaling coopetition and competition when the value of ∆c is either small or large. In contrast, when the 
value of ∆c is in the middle, the same strategic choice is determined by the relationship between 𝜃 and 𝜃𝑐. 
Therefore, we can conclude that firms must incorporate the external market competition, inter-firm 
relationship characteristics and internal operational resources and capabilities to make an optimal strategic 
decision on coopetition.  
      
Figure 6(a) ∆𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟏                        Figure 6(b) ∆𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓         
     
Figure 6(c) ∆𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟒                        Figure 6(d) ∆𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟓         
Figure 6 Effect of ∆𝒄 on selection of coopetition strategies (𝜷: 𝟎 → 𝟏𝟎) 
6. The extended models:  














































In the previous sections, we assume a symmetric case in which 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼. Here, 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 represent 
the maximum retail prices of manufacturers 1 and 2, respectively. In this section, we consider the scenario in 
which 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2. Then, the demand function 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗), 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Based on this 
demand function, the optimal solutions for the competition, WC and LC models are provided in Table 3. The 
derivation of these optimal solutions is provided in the Appendix.  
Comparing the optimal solutions in Table 3 to those in Table 2, it is clear that 𝛼1, 𝛼2 significantly 
affect manufacturers’ optimal operational decisions. Consequently, they will affect manufacturers’ profits in 
the competition, WC and LC models and the values of important critical thresholds that determine 
manufacturers’ optimal decision regions on coopetition strategy selection. Therefore, to verify whether the 
structural results presented in the symmetric case still hold in the asymmetric-manufacturer case, a numerical 
example is provided here to demonstrate the effect of the asymmetric-manufacturer case (i.e., 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2) on 
the selection of coopetition strategies. We assume that 𝛿1 = 1 and 𝛽 = 4. In Figure 7, we specify that 
𝛼2 − 𝛼1 = 0.1, which means that 𝛼2 > 𝛼1. In Figure 8, we specify that 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 = −0.1, which means that 
𝛼2 < 𝛼1.  
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Table 3. Optimal solutions for the three models (𝜶𝟏 ≠ 𝜶𝟐) 
Models Competition model 
(𝑖 = 𝑛) 
WC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑐) 
LC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑙) 
𝑞1
𝑖  (2 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 𝛽(∆𝑐 − ∆𝛼)
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)(𝛽(1 + 𝛽)Δα(−2 + 𝜃) + 𝛿1(8 + 3𝛽
2 + 𝛽(14 + 𝜃))) − 𝛽𝑇𝑙
2(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
 
(4 + 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1 − 2𝛽(1 + 𝛽)Δα
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑝1
𝑖  𝑚 + 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑛 𝑚 + 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑙  
𝑞2
𝑖  (2 + 𝛽)𝛿2 − 𝛽(∆𝑐 − ∆𝛼)
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)(𝛿1 + Δα + 𝛽Δα)(2 − 𝜃) + 𝑇𝑙
(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
  
2(𝛿1 + Δα + 𝛽Δα)
4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2
 
𝑝2
𝑖  𝑚 + 𝑐2 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞2𝑛 𝑚 + 𝑐1 +
1
2(1 + 𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
((1 + 𝛽)(Δα(12 + 36𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 4𝛽3 + 2𝜃 + 6𝛽𝜃 + 5𝛽2𝜃 + 𝛽3𝜃)
+ 𝛿1(3𝛽
3 + 2(6 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(8 + 𝜃) + 𝛽2(20 + 𝜃))) − 𝑇𝑙) 
𝑚 + 𝑐1 +
𝛿1(4 + 12𝛽 + 8𝛽
2 + 𝛽3) + 4(1 + 3𝛽 + 2𝛽2)Δα
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑤𝑖 / 𝑐1 +
1
2(1 + 𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
((1 + 𝛽)(3𝛽3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 + 𝜃))𝛿1
+ 2((1 + 𝛽)2(𝛽2(1 + 𝜃) + 2(2 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(2 + 𝜃))Δα − 𝑇𝑙) 
/ 
𝑟𝑖    𝛽((2 + 𝛽)
2𝛿1 − 4𝛽(1 + 𝛽)Δα)
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑀𝑖    8𝛿1Δα(4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃 + 𝛽
2(3 + 𝜃)) + 4(1 + 𝛽)Δα2(4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃 + 𝛽2(3 + 𝜃))
4(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)2
+
𝛿1
2(16(1 + 𝛽)2 − (32 + 96𝛽 + 76𝛽2 + 16𝛽3 + 𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃))
4(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)2
 
where 𝑇𝑙 = ((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽
2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + (1 + 𝛽)2Δα2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1







Figure 7. Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜶𝟐 > 𝜶𝟏) 
  
Figure 8. Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜶𝟐 < 𝜶𝟏) 
From Figures 7 and 8, we obtain that the structure of an optimal strategic decision on coopetition is 
similar to the scenario with the same maximum retail price for the two manufacturers. At the same time, the 
critical points are affected by the difference between the maximum retail prices of manufacturers (∆𝛼). That 
is, a positive ∆𝛼 results in a larger decision region for LC strategy and a smaller region for competition 
strategy; conversely, a negative ∆𝛼 leads to a smaller decision region for LC strategy and a larger region for 






















manufacturer 2 does, it is less likely that license coopetition is the optimal strategic decision. Clearly, 𝛼1, 𝛼2 
affect manufacturers’ optimal operational decisions (e.g., retail prices, wholesale price, fixed license fee, and 
royalty rate) and the values of important critical thresholds that influence manufacturers’ optimal decisions 
on coopetition strategy. Nevertheless, the structural results presented in the previous sections still hold when 
two manufacturers are asymmetric.  
6.2 The case of both partial and perfect substitutes 
In this section, we extend the analysis of the partially substitutable products case to the case that includes the 
scenarios of partial and perfect substitutes. We adopt the demand function, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽𝑞𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 
and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 0 < 𝛽 ≤ 1, that is used in Wang et al. (2013). Here, 0 < 𝛽 < 1 corresponds to the scenario of 
partial substitutes, and the limiting value, 𝛽 = 1, corresponds to the case of perfect substitutes. Based on the 
new demand function, the optimal solutions for the competition, WC and LC models are presented in Table 
4. 
Table 4. Optimal solutions for the three models for the general substitutable product case 
Models Competition 
model (𝑖 = 𝑛) 
WC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑐) 
LC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑙) 
𝑞1
𝑖  𝛽Δc + (2 − 𝛽)𝛿1
4 − 𝛽2
 
𝛿1(8 − 2𝛽 − 3𝛽
2 + (𝛽 − 𝛽2)𝜃 − 𝛽𝑇𝑎)
2(8 − 5𝛽2)
 




𝑖  𝑚 + 𝑐1 + 𝑞1
𝑛 𝑚 + 𝑐1 + 𝑞1
𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐1 + 𝑞1
𝑙  
𝑞2
𝑖  −2Δc + (2 − 𝛽)𝛿1
4 − 𝛽2
 







𝑖  𝑚 + 𝑐2 + 𝑞2
𝑛 
 𝑚 + 𝑤𝑐 +
(2 − 2𝛽 − 𝛽2 + 𝛽3)(2 − 𝜃)𝛿1 + 𝛽𝑇𝑎
2(8 − 5𝛽2)
 𝑚 + 𝑐1 +
(4 − 4𝛽2 + 𝛽3)𝛿1
2(4 − 3𝛽2)
 
𝑤 𝑖 / 
𝑐1 +
𝛿1(8 − 6𝛽








𝑀𝑖 / / (−16 + 36𝛽






where 𝑇𝑎 = √((12 − 8𝛽 − 𝛽
2)(1 − 𝜃) + (1 − 2𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝜃2). 
Comparing the optimal solutions in Table 4 to those in Table 2, it is clear that the optimal solutions are 
presented in different mathematical formations due to a different expression of β in the new demand function. 
We then repeat the same analysis of Section 3, 4 and 5 to examine how different internal operational factors 
and external market circumstances affect the selectin of coopetition strategies with the new demand function. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 9 and Figure 10, which correspond to the scenarios of partial and perfect 
substitutes respectively.  
 


































Figure 10. Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜽, ∆𝒄, 𝜷 = 𝟏) 
From Figure 9, it is clear that the selection of coopetition strategies maintains the same structural result for 
the scenario of partial substitutes (0 < 𝛽 < 1) regardless of the new demand function. From Figure 10, 
interestingly, although the selection decision between competition and WC is similar to the scenario of 
partial substitutes, license coopetition is no longer an option for optimal selection of coopetition strategies 
for the scenario of perfect substitutes (𝛽 = 1). It means that firms should not consider license coopetition if 
their products are perfectly substitutable. This is due to that 𝜃𝑗, whose relationship with θ determines the 
optimal choice between LC and WC, depends upon β. The value of 𝜃𝑗 equals 1 when 𝛽 = 1. Perfect substitutes 
often indicate an intense market competition. This finding is also consistent to the industrial practice that 
firms do not license key technology to rival firms when there is an intense market competition.    
7. Managerial relevance and insights 
Our research findings are beneficial to firms in industries such as high tech (e.g., smartphone, automobile, 
PC, and medical devices) that are characterized by rapid technological development and short product life 
cycles, particularly for those firms currently engaging in some form of cooperation (i.e., buyer-supplier 
relationships and license agreements) with their competitors or have an intention to do so. In this dynamic 
and competitive market environment, firms must compete with more-sophisticated strategies rather than 
simply focusing on product or price. Coopetition has become a viable strategic option as shown in the 
smartphone, automobile, and pharmaceutical industries. However, firms face a dilemma when cooperating 
with their competitors. As illustrated in this paper, production coopetition either through wholesaling or 
license agreements, on the one hand, provides an extra revenue stream or reduces production cost for the two 
manufacturers; on the other hand, it incurs a loss in the competition with an enhanced rival for customer 
demand. Whether firms should opt for coopetition depends upon the tradeoff between the conflicting 
cooperating and competing forces, which is determined by a combination of external, relationship-specific, 
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and internal factors. Our research comprehensively examines how these factors affect firms’ optimal strategy 
selection decisions and suggests a broad set of decision outcomes that have not been captured in previous 
studies (Luo et al. 2016; Yang et al. 2017). Based on the findings, we propose a decision framework as 
illustrated in Table 4 to provide some strategic guidance for firms’ optimal decisions concerning coopetition 
strategies.  
Table 4 Strategic guidance on coopetition 
Parameters Optimal strategic decision   
Product substitution rate (𝜷) 
Low  Medium  High  
  
Manufacturer 1’s 
negotiation power (𝜽) 
Strong  LC  LC/WC  WC  
Similar  C C/WC WC WC/C C 
 
Low C … C … C  
Operational capability difference 
(∆𝒄) 
Small  Medium  High  
Note: C, LC, and WC refer to Competition, License Coopetition and Wholesaling Coopetition, respectively.  
    The decision framework systematically outlines how the external, relationship-specific and internal 
factors (i.e., 𝛽, 𝜃, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑐) affect the strategy selection, which will be useful for firms in a similar business 
environment to make important strategic decisions. Here, 𝛽 measures the cross-effect of the change in one 
manufacturer’s product demand caused by a change in that of the other manufacturer. A high degree of 
product substitution tends to intensify the market competition between two manufacturers. 𝜃 characterizes 
the inter-firm power relationship between manufacturers in the negotiation of the wholesaling or licensing 
agreement. For instance, firms with superior component production capability should not supply key 
components or license relevant technology to rival firms when they hold less negotiation/bargaining power, 
despite the conditions of degree of product substitution and difference in their operational capabilities. When 
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there is more-balanced negotiation power between the rival firms, they should consider wholesaling 
coopetition if there is a medium level of product substitution between rival firms and opt for competition 
only if the product substitution level is low or high. Note that this situation is the only one in which the 
operational capability difference (∆𝑐) will also play a role in influencing the optimal strategic choice between 
wholesaling coopetition and competition, as discussed in Section 5.2. When they have a more dominant 
negotiation power, license coopetition should be selected if the degree to which their products are 
substitutable is low and, conversely, wholesaling coopetition should be chosen.  
     Considering the dynamic nature of competition and cooperation dualism (Dorn et al. 2016), 
coopetition itself will affect the nature of market competition and interfirm relationships. With changing 
market dynamics, power relationships, and internal operational capacities, firms should regularly examine 
their optimal coopetition strategy because any change in these factors could alter the outcome of their 
original strategy selection. With a better understanding of the underlying economic principle that governs the 
coopetition decision, our research findings could support firms in making correct strategic and operational 
decisions and improve their business competitiveness. 
8. Conclusions 
This study systematically examines the effect of two coopetition strategies on the performance of two rival 
manufacturers. By comparing the two manufacturers’ prices and profits for competition, wholesaling 
coopetition, and license coopetition models, we derive notable results that provide a richer representation of 
firms’ strategic behavior concerning coopetition. Our study provides a broader set of decision outcomes that 
have not been reported by other studies concerning coopetition. Coopetition in the context of wholesaling or 
license cooperation and pure competition does not necessarily increase profits. Whether the economic effect 
from the coopetition strategy is positive or negative is determined by the external market characteristics, 
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inter-firm power relationship, and the difference between the rival firms’ capabilities and efficiencies of their 
internal operations. Specifically, we demonstrate the following: 
• The optimal decision for the coopetition strategies (e.g., competition vs. coopetition or wholesaling vs. 
licensing) is determined by the tradeoff between the benefit that is gained from the production 
cooperation and the losses that are caused by market competition when faced with a strengthened 
competitor. The benefits of cooperation and the losses incurred from competition are determined by a 
combination of important external and internal factors including the degree to which their products are 
substitutable (β), manufacturers’ negotiation power (θ), maximum retail prices (𝛼1, 𝛼2 ) and cost 
difference in component production (∆𝑐). These factors depend upon the internal operational and 
technological capabilities of the involved firms, relationship-specific characteristics, and the external 
market environment. Essentially, the optimal choice of the coopetition strategy is governed by the 
dynamic relationship between the cooperating and competing forces, which is also subject to changes in 
internal operational capabilities and/or the external market environment over time. 
• An enduring coopetitive relationship requires that the firms achieve a win-win outcome. When either 
wholesaling coopetition or license coopetition is the optimal strategy, situations exist in which one of the 
manufacturers is worse off despite an increase in the total profit between the two manufacturers. In those 
situations, a further operational mechanism (i.e., profit-sharing contracts) could be designed to achieve a 
win-win outcome. Furthermore, the difference between the two manufacturers’ unit component costs (∆𝑐) 
profoundly affects whether wholesaling and license coopetition deliver a Pareto improvement. A Pareto 
improvement will more likely be achieved if the two competing firms cooperate on an operation function 
in which there is a substantial difference in efficiency/capability between the two firms.  
• We identify that Pareto improvement in both wholesaling and license coopetition leads to increased 
profits for both manufacturers and decreased retail prices as shown in Propositions 1 and 2. Therefore, 
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coopetition can positively affect individual firms and consumers. This situation is different from 
collusion, in which firms increase producers’ surplus by raising prices and consumers are penalized by 
the decreasing consumer surplus, which leads to a decrease in social welfare (Rusko 2011). In this case, 
coopetition is an economically sustainable strategy that benefits both firms and consumers.  
Similar to many other studies using modeling approaches, we made several assumptions. Relaxing 
these assumptions can imply directions for future research. For instance, a linear, additive deterministic 
demand function is adopted in this research. This form of demand function is widely adopted in similar 
studies (Wang et al. 2013; Qing et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2017) and has the advantage of being analytically 
more tractable. Nevertheless, market uncertainty is one of the critical factors that determine the success of 
coopetition strategies (Ritala 2012). One future avenue is to apply stochastic models to explore how the 
results might be influenced by demand uncertainty. Furthermore, we assume that manufacturer 2 is able to 
produce the common component to the same quality level as can manufacturer 1 but at a higher production 
cost. Nevertheless, without the common component, the quality of manufacturer 2’s product might be 
negatively affected and consequently decrease customer demand. One valuable future extension is to 
consider such a case and incorporate the quality aspect into the modeling. In addition, to focus on the 
component production cooperation, we use an assumption that the two manufacturers’ unit production costs 
are identical. In practice, manufacturers could have different unit product costs. Thus, one future extension is 
to consider this additional internal operational factor and examine how different costs would materially affect 
the findings. 
Second, this study only considers manufacturers that engage in a dyadic coopetitive relationship. In 
practice, market competition often involves more than two firms. Incorporating more firms in a network 
setting would certainly change the dynamics of market competition and interfirm relationships and could 
thus affect firms’ optimal strategies concerning coopetition. It would be interesting to study a network setting 
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more complex than the dyadic setting adopted in this research.  
Finally, coopetition could be employed as a new strategy for other value chain activities (e.g., R&D and 
logistics services). For example, to achieve carbon emission-reduction targets, one strategic response from 
the automotive industry is to cooperate with rival firms on green technologies and innovations. Similarly, in 
the online retailing sector, many online retailers have the dilemma of whether to invest in their own 
distribution and logistics operation or use the delivery service provided by marketplace firms such as 
Amazon or Alibaba. Although different model settings are required to evaluate the effectiveness of 
coopetition strategies, it would be interesting to evaluate the effect of coopetition on other supply chain 
operations. 
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